I. INTRODUCTION
HE past Survey year was one of incremental change in the healthlaw arena. As usual in odd-numbered years, the most significant changes in law came out of the Texas legislature, although the agencies and Texas Supreme Court made their own notable contributions, particularly with respect to telemedicine, hospital districts' liability for indigent health care, and the use of physician extenders.
Brief mention should be made of changes in law that did not occur in 2009. Two competing versions of bills to amend the so-called "futility provision" of the Texas Advance Directives Act'-one to address numerous suggestions for making the law more "family-friendly" and more procedurally balanced, 2 the other to eviscerate the futility provision altogether 3 -both died without getting a floor vote. The result thus resembled a similar standoff in the 2007 legislative session, and there may very well be a replay, with an uncertain outcome, when the 82nd Legislature is gaveled to a close in 2011.
II. PHYSICIANS

A. SUPERVISION AND DELEGATION
Cost-conscious states and private health plans are increasingly looking to "physician extenders" to provide health care services to patients through less-expensive providers, including physician assistants and nurse practitioners. During the past year, the legislature and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (THHSC) wrestled with some of the implications of this development, which shows no signs of slowing down.
Effective August 5, 2009, the THHSC adopted a new regulation and amended an existing regulation pertaining to "Authorized Physician Services" in connection with the state Medicaid program. 4 The new regulation differentiates "direct supervision," which requires the supervising physician to be in the same office, building, or facility and immediately available to help, and "personal supervision," which requires the supervising physician's physical presence. 5 Also in that section, THHSC clarified "when a supervising physician may bill Medicaid for services provided by resident physicians in the context of a [graduate medical education] program and services provided by other professionals."
6 Specifically, the regulation clarifies that services provided by a physician assistant or advanced practice nurse are also "covered services" under the chapter. 7 Also, "covered physician services" include services performed by the physician, medical acts delegated by the physician to persons under the physician's supervision, and services performed by other physicians in relation to a graduate medical education program. 8 Senate Bill 381, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Occupations Code section 157.101(b-1), relating to the authority of physicians to delegate to certain pharmacists the implementation and modification of a patient's drug therapy. 9 Physicians can delegate to pharmacists if (1) the delegation follows a diagnosis, patient assessment, and drug therapy or-der, (2) the pharmacist practices in the hospital, hospital clinic, or institution, (3) the hospital has bylaws that allow such, (4) the pharmacist provides his or her contact information and the physician's contact information on each prescription signed by the pharmacist, and (5) the pharmacist provides the protocol to the Texas State Board of Pharmacy.10 The board must list on its website a list of pharmacists who are authorized to sign prescription drug orders under this section and their delegating physicians."
Senate Bill 532, effective September 1, 2009, amends Occupations Pas Code section 157.0511, regarding a physician's delegation of prescriptive authority to physician assistants (PA) or advanced practice nurses (APNs).1 2 The board must adopt rules that require a delegating physician to register the name and license number of the PA or APN to whom the physician delegates. 13 Section 157.053(a) is amended to include in the definition of primary practice site a location where the PA or APN practices on-site with the delegating physician more than fifty percent of the time and provides health care services for established patients, charity health care services, or emergency relief services.1 4 Section 157.0541 is amended to provide that physician supervision is adequate for the section if the delegating physician is on-site with the APN or PA for ten percent of the hours of operation of the site each month, the delegating physician reviews ten percent of the medical charts for each APN and PA at the site, and the delegating physician is available for assistance or consultation.1 5 A physician may delegate to no more than four PAs or APNs.1 6 If the board determines that the types of services provided by PAs and APNs are limited in nature and duration, then the board can modify or waive (1) the limitation on the number of PAs and APNs, up to six PAs or APNs, (2) the mileage limitation, or (3) the on-site supervision requirements.' 7 B. PHYSICIAN RANKINGS House Bill 1888, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Insurance Code chapter 1460, pertaining to standards required regarding certain physician rankings by health benefit plans. 1 8 Under chapter 1460, a health plan issuer cannot rank physicians, sort physicians into "tiers," or publish any ranking or tiered information unless (1) the standards used are nationally recognized standards and guidelines adopted by the Insurance Commissioner, (2) the standards are disclosed to each affected physician, and (3) each physician has an opportunity to dispute the ranking at least forty-five days before publication.1 9 The statute provides specific procedures which ensure due process for a physician who wishes to challenge the rankings. 20 However, a physician cannot request or require patients to agree not to rank or participate in surveys regarding the physician.
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In developing the standards, the health plan issuer must ensure that physicians are actively involved in the development of standards and that the measures and methodology used in the ranking system are valid and transparent. An electronic signature is a "facsimile, scan, uploaded image, computergenerated image, or other electronic representation of a manual signature" that is intended by the user to have the effect of a manual signature, and requirements for an electronic signature are provided by section
166.011(2).39
Additionally, section 166.032 provides that a declarant may sign a directive and have the signature acknowledged before a notary instead of signing before witnesses. 40 Similarly, section 166.082(b) allows a declarant to sign an OOH-DNR order and have the signature acknowledged before a notary instead of signing the DNR order before witnesses.
4 1 Finally, a medical power of attorney may be signed by the principal and the signature acknowledged by a notary without the presence of witnesses.
2
If the principal is unable to physically sign the medical power of attorney, another person may sign the medical power of attorney in the principal's presence and at the principal's direction using a digital or electronic signature under section 166.154(c). .1125 of the Government Code was added to require that a state agency that owns or maintains data including sensitive personal information must comply with the notification requirements of Business and Commerce Code section 521.053 in the event of a breach of security. 46 Local governments are subject to the same requirement pursuant to section 205.010 of the Local Government Code. 4 7 Finally, Health and Safety Code section 181.006 was added to provide that for a non-governmental covered entity, protected health information includes any information that a person received health care from the covered entity. 48 That information is not public information. care information.
5 0 Health care information now includes payment information, and a hospital cannot release payment information without patient authorization.
5 1 Also, under this section, the hospital can charge a fee for requested records provided to the patient or the patient's legally authorized agent by digital or electronic medium.
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D. PRESCRIPTIONS, DRUGS, AND TESTING
The Texas Medical Board issued an emergency amendment to its disciplinary guidelines, creating an exception to the general rule that a physician may prescribe drugs only to a patient with whom the doctor has a professional relationship. 53 Beginning April 4, 2009, the general rule did not preclude a physician's prescribing drugs to a partner of a patient who may have a sexually transmitted disease.
54 Thus, the physician could prescribe drugs to a non-patient in this limited circumstance. The emergency rule was made permanent as of June 24, 2009.55
House Bill 1924, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Occupations Code section 562.1011, which permits a nurse or practitioner in a rural hospital to withdraw a drug from a hospital pharmacy if there is no hospital pharmacist on duty or the pharmacy is closed and the drugs have been ordered by a practitioner.
5 6 Within seven days of such withdrawal, the hospital pharmacist must verify and review the withdrawal.
5 7 Furthermore, a pharmacy technician in a rural hospital may, without direct supervision, enter medication orders into the data system, prepare, package, and label prescription drugs, fill a medication cart, distribute routine orders to patient care areas, and access and restock automated medication supply cabinets. 5 8 The pharmacy technician must be registered, and a pharmacist must be accessible at all times to respond to the pharmacy technician's questions. 59 The pharmacist-in-charge in a rural hospital must also develop and implement policies for pharmacy operation when no pharmacist is on-site, and rural hospitals can establish standing protocols to include additional exceptions for when prospective drug use is necessary. 60 Finally, section 568.008 permits a Class C pharmacy with an ongoing clinical pharmacy program to allow a pharmacy technician to verify another pharmacy technician's work relating to certain tasks if the patient orders have been reviewed previously by a phar- 69 Section 33.0111 requires that the Department develop a statement to clearly disclose to the parent or guardian of a newborn child (1) that the Department can retain genetic material used to conduct the newborn screening test, and how the material will be used, and (2) that the parent or guardian can limit the use of genetic material by providing a written statement to such effect. 70 This disclosure statement must be included on paperwork that informs the parents about the screening, must be on a separate sheet, and must be presented with a statement that allows the parent to limit the use of the genetic material.
7 ' The physician attending the newborn must present the disclosure statement to the parents when the newborn is subjected to the screening, and the Department must develop procedures to provide verification to the Department that the parents were provided with the statement. 72 Under section 33.0112, the parent or guardian may file a written statement with the Department prohibiting the retention and use of the genetic material, and the department must destroy the genetic material within sixty days of receiving the statement. 73 Furthermore, all records relating to this chapter are confidential and not subject to subpoena except under limited circumstances, such as with client consent or by court order. 74 [Vol. 63the child or family is not identified, disclosure for statistical purposes or quality assurance purposes is permitted. 7 5 House Bill 1795, effective September 1, 2009, is entitled "Greyson's Law" and amends Health and Safety Code section 33.011(a-1), relating to newborn screening by requiring the Department of Health to add at least twenty disorders to the list of required newborn screening tests.
7 6 Section 33.017 creates a Newborn Screening Advisory Committee, which consists of members appointed by the state health services commissioner and must include health care providers, a hospital representative, persons with family members affected by a condition for which newborn screening is required, and persons involved in the delivery of newborn services. 77 Also, section 81.090 is amended to provide that a physician attending a pregnant woman must test the woman in her third trimester for HIV infection and must retain reports of each case for nine months. 78 Similarly, a physician present at a delivery shall test the woman on admission for delivery for syphilis and hepatitis B, and if the physician discovers that the woman has not been tested for HIV, the physician must expeditiously test her for HIV infection. 7 9 If a physician present at delivery does not find in the woman's records a test for HIV infection, and such test was not performed prior to delivery, the physician should test the newborn child for HIV infection less than two hours after birth. 80 However, a physician may not conduct any of the aforementioned tests if the woman or the newborn child's parent or guardian objects to the test. while attempting to stand using his hospital bed footboard.84 Marks sued St. Luke's for negligence, alleging failure to train and supervise staff properly, failure to provide him living assistance, failure to provide a safe environment, and providing a negligently assembled and maintained hospital bed.
8 5 The trial court characterized Marks's claim as a health care liability claim under the MLIIA and granted St. Luke's motion to dismiss in light of Marks's failure to file a timely expert report as required by the statute. 86 The court of appeals originally concluded that Marks did not assert a health care liability claim, but on remand from the Texas Supreme Court, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision. 8 7
The Texas Supreme Court held that Marks asserted both a health-care liability claim, which was subject to the requirements of the MLIIA, and a premises-liability claim, which was not subject to the Act's requirements. 88 To begin its analysis, the supreme court looked to the language of the MLIIA:
The Act defines a "health care liability claim" as "a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or health care or safety" proximately resulting in a patient's injury or death. The Act does not define safety. 8 9
To avoid a characterization of his claim as a health care liability claim, Marks argued that "safety" should be construed to include only patient care and treatment safety. 90 St. Luke's countered that "safety" includes any unsafe condition in a health care facility.91
The supreme court then looked to the legislative intent behind the MLIIA and concluded that the legislature's primary intent was to curb the medical malpractice crisis. 92 Since medical malpractice insurance does not typically cover premises-liability claims, the supreme court was forced to determine if Marks's claim could be distinguished from the rendition of medical services. 93 To this end, the supreme court listed three factors it considered: "(1) whether the specialized knowledge of a medical expert may be necessary to prove the claim, (2) whether a specialized standard in the health care community applies to the alleged circumstances, and (3) whether the negligent act involves medical judgment related to the patient's care or treatment. The supreme court first examined Marks's claims of negligent patient supervision and staff training. Finding these claims similar to claims made by a nursing home resident, which the supreme court held to be health care liability claims in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 95 the supreme court concluded that Marks' training and supervision claims were health care liability claims under the MLIIA. 9 6 As to Marks's claim that St. Luke's negligently assembled and maintained the hospital bed, the key question was whether the unsafe bed was separable from the rendition of medical or health care services, or alternatively, whether the assembly and maintenance of the hospital bed required medical judgment. 97 Since there was no evidence that the bed's assembly or maintenance required medical judgment (unlike special treatment beds or medical restraints), the supreme court held that the bed was "merely incidental to the patient's care" and that the MLIIA was not implicated. 98 Thus, Marks pled both a health-care liability claim under the MLIIA and an ordinary negligence claim. The supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It is difficult not to agree with the four dissenting justices that the majority's opinion encourages artful pleading to get around the various limitations and requirements that apply to health-care liability claims under the MLIIA but not to ordinary negligence claims (such as premises liability).1oo
In Hernandez v. Ebrom,' 0 the Texas Supreme Court held that a health care provider's failure to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the adequacy of a plaintiff's expert report does not preclude challenging the report on appeal. 102 Doctor Hernandez of the McAllen Bone and Joint Clinic performed knee surgery on Julious Ebrom.1 03 Ebrom filed a health care liability suit for complications from the surgery against Hernandez and the Clinic. 104 As required by the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Ebrom timely filed an expert report, and both defendants alleged that the report was deficient and filed motions to dismiss, seeking attorney's fees and costs.' 0 5 The trial court denied the motion as to Hernandez but granted it as to the clinic.1 06 Before trial, Ebrom nonsuited Hernandez, and the trial court dismissed the case. 107 court of appeals dismissed Hernandez's claim for lack of jurisdiction, because the nonsuit rendered the order denying his motion to dismiss moot.1 09 On appeal to the supreme court, Ebrom argued that because Hernandez did not pursue an interlocutory appeal challenging the adequacy of his expert report permitted by section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Hernandez waived his complaint.
0
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Hernandez by holding that the legislature's authorization of an interlocutory appeal in these circumstances does not imply that the legislature required an interlocutory appeal."i' The supreme court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for a determination of Hernandez's claim on the merits. 112 Chief Justice Jefferson dissented and argued that the purpose of an interlocutory appeal in this situation is "to quickly dispense with frivolous health care litigation.I" 3 Thus, if the defendant can wait to challenge the expert report until after final judgment (rather than filing an interlocutory appeal after an unsuccessful challenge of the expert report), this "injects an element of uncertainty into the case and risks turning this screening mechanism into a trump card."1 1 4 Thus, Chief Justice Jefferson would hold that a defendant's failure to take an interlocutory appeal after an unsuccessful challenge of a plaintiff's expert report waives the defendant's right to appeal the adequacy of the report. 11 5 In Badiga v. Lopez," 6 another expert-report case, the Texas Supreme Court held that a health care provider may make an interlocutory appeal when a plaintiff has failed to file an expert report and the trial court both denies the health care provider's motion to dismiss and grants the plaintiff a thirty-day extension to file the report. 1 17 Plaintiff Maricruz Lopez filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Murthy Badiga after a colonoscopy.11 8 The Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires plaintiffs to file an expert report within 120 days after commencing a health care liability suit, but Lopez filed none.11 9 Dr. Badiga filed a motion to dismiss, and a month later, Lopez moved for more time to file an expert report.1 20 The trial court granted the extension and did not rule on Dr. Badiga's 109. Id. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on the mootness issue. The court of appeals had relied on two of its own previous decisions in which it found the providers' appeal to have been moot after the trial court's dismissal of the claims against them. Both cases, however, were reversed by the supreme court after the court of appeals decision in the instant case. motion to dismiss. 12 1 Lopez filed an expert report within the extended time, and Dr. Badiga filed a second motion to dismiss which incorporated his first motion and challenged the adequacy of the report. 122 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Dr. Badiga filed an interlocutory appeal.1 23 Holding that the appeal pertained to the thirty-day extension, which was not appealable, the court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.1
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Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351(b) prescribes that if the required expert report is not timely filed, the court shall award the physician attorney's fees and costs and dismiss the claim with prejudice. 125 Section 74.351(c) permits the trial court to grant a thirtyday extension to allow the plaintiff to cure a report found to be deficient.1 26 Interlocutory appeal is permitted by section 51.014(a)(9) from an order that denies relief under section 74.351(b), except there is no interlocutory appeal from an order granting an extension.1 27 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court noted the distinction: "[I]nterlocutory appeal is permitted for the denial of a motion to dismiss but not for the grant of an extension to cure a deficient report."'
28
Badiga presented the supreme court with a question of first impression: whether an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a doctor's motion to dismiss is permitted when the trial court grants an extension not merely to cure the deficiencies in a filed report but to file a report in the first instance.1 29 The supreme court considered the policy behind allowing an interlocutory appeal in these circumstances, and it concluded that interlocutory appeals should be permitted when the plaintiff has utterly failed to file any report, as opposed to filing a timely but inadequate report. In the supreme court's view, this result is a corollary of the legislative policy that forbids the trial court from denying the defendant's motion to dismiss or granting the plaintiff an extension to file when the plaintiff has missed the 120-day deadline for filing an expert report, which the supreme court likened to a statute of limitations. 13 ' Dr. Badiga properly appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss, which should be considered on the merits separate and apart from the granting of an extension.1 3 2
The supreme court thus reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the trial court's denial of Dr. Badiga's motion to dismiss on In Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital,1 34 the Texas Supreme Court held that county hospital districts are immune from suits to recover medical expenses for services rendered to indigent patients pursuant to the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act. 35 The Tomball Hospital Authority (THA) operates Tomball Regional Hospital (the Hospital).1 36 The Hospital rendered medical services to indigent Harris County residents under the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act and sought reimbursement from the Harris County Hospital District (the District) pursuant to the Act.' 3 7 The District refused to pay, and THA sued.' 3 8 In response, the District made a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting governmental immunity from suit.
13 9 The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case, but the court of appeals determined that section 281.056 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides that hospital district boards may "sue and be sued," waives the District's immunity.1 40 The Texas Supreme Court reversed.
The supreme court first noted the general rule that hospital districts have governmental immunity that may be waived only by "clear and unambiguous language."141 Though section 281.056 allows hospital district boards to "be sued," the supreme court determined that "the Legislature intended to invest districts with powers and authority necessary to conduct their business."1 42 There is, however, no indication that by use of the 'sue and be sued' language the Legislature clearly intended to waive hospital districts' immunity from suit."1 4 3 THA argued that article 9, section 4, of the Texas constitution waives the District's immunity from suit when it requires the District to "assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care to needy inhabitants of the county." 1 " However, the supreme court held that the constitution merely imposes liability on the District; it does not detail how the hospital's liability may be enforced (for example, by suit). 1 4 5 Finally, the supreme court examined other statutory provisions, like the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act, and found no clear waiver of to the Health and Safety Code to authorize the board of the Dallas County Hospital District (the District) to hire physicians, dentists, and other health care providers in order to meet its indigent-care responsibilities through its community-oriented primary care clinics.' The law provides an exception to the state's prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine, which would otherwise prevent the District from employing the health care professionals. The board may employ health care providers for a maximum term of four years "as the board considers necessary for the efficient operation of the district."1 52 This power extends only to the extent necessary to fulfill the District's requirement to provide health care for indigent residents.1 53 However, consistent with the philosophy behind the corporate-practice doctrine, section 281.0282 specifically does not authorize the board to supervise or control the practice of medicine.
1 54 Section 281.0282 requires the District to create a committee of at least five practicing physicians to approve policies and "ensure that a physician who is employed by the district is exercising the physician's independent medical judgment in providing care to patients." 56 Under this section, the board must grant a provisional license to a physician in good standing in another state so that the physician can practice medicine in an underserved area. 1 57 Among other requirements, the physician must be sponsored by a licensed physician unless it would pose a hardship to the applying physician. 1 58 An underserved area is an area that has been designated by the federal government as a health-professional shortage area or by the federal or state government as a medically underserved area. 159 A provisional license expires upon the earlier of the issuance or denial of a license or the 270th day after the issuance of the provisional license. Under the amended section, a health care facility or a pediatric and adolescent hospital must report not only the incidence of surgical site infections but also the causative pathogen. 162 The law also amends chapter 98 of the Health and Safety Code to expand the scope of the Advisory Panel on Health Care-Associated Infections to include "preventable adverse events." The amendment creates a reporting requirement for preventable adverse events by each health care facility to the Department of State Health Services.1 63 Events that must be reported include: (1) a health care-associated adverse condition not covered by Medicare and (2) an event from the list of adverse events of the National Quality Forum. 164 Further, section 98.109 is amended to protect state employees and officers from being questioned in civil, criminal, or other proceedings about the existence or contents of the information concerning health-care-associated infections and preventable adverse events. 165 
624
[Vol. 63
Health Care Law
VIII. CONCLUSION
Every two years the legislature spends six months considering hundreds upon hundreds of bills dealing with public health, health care providers of every type, patient issues, and taxation and liability rules that shape the delivery of health care services within the state of Texas. As this past Survey year illustrates, we are increasingly challenged to develop statutory responses to keep up with technological, medical, and political developments. Telemedicine, to take but one example from this past year, is a fast-moving field in which business practices change faster than many full-time legislatures can respond.
With the passage of a sweeping federal health care reform law in 2010, and the promulgation of well over 1,000 implementing regulations over the next four years, the need for speed as well as thoughtful deliberation will pose major challenges to state law-makers. Our new telemedicine rules illustrate an approach to developing timely responses to changes in federal law. Broad statutory delegations to state agencies that will then have the authority to develop regulatory responses to changes coming out of Washington may be our best hope for dealing with an increasingly complex health-law regime.
